

LAMPIRAN

Lampiran 1

RIWAYAT HIDUP



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EDUCATION

- **SD Muhammadiyah 1 Bontang (2006-2012)**
- **SMP Muhammadiyah Boarding School Yogyakarta (2012-2015)**
- **Madrasah Aliyah Negeri Bontang (2015-2018)**
- **Universitas Muhammadiyah Kalimantan Timur (2018-2022)**

WORK EXPERIENCES

Kementerian Sosial Republik Indonesia

Pejuang Muda Kemensos (*Internship of Merdeka Belajar Kampus Merdeka Program*)

- The social project entitled "Community Empowerment of Disaster Response Areas in Samarinda through Development of Internet of Things-Based Flood Mitigation System"
- Verified and collected data on recipients of BPNT and PKH by conducting field surveys through the Sagis application

Reviewnesia Media

Research Assistant (*Internship*)

- Conducted research, collected, and analyzed international issues, and wrote in articles or journals

Dinas Komunikasi dan Informatika Provinsi Kalimantan Timur

Information, Public Communication, and Public Relations (*Internship*)

- Managed Public Communication Media, observed opinion, attended seminars, and published on social media

ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCES

Dewan Perwakilan Mahasiswa (DPM KM UMKT)

- Internal commission of legal division staff

Korps Mahasiswa Hubungan Internasional (KOMAH I UMKT)

- General Secretary

Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa (BEM KM UMKT)

- Young staff of the Department of Social and Political

PROJECTS & RESEARCH

- **Project:** Appointed as Task Force Team Borang International Relations Department and get a “B” Accreditation (2019-2020)
- **Research:** Collaborated research on Student’s Perceptions of Political Situations Given the Disciplines Learned at UMKT with Psychology and International Relations lecturers (2019)
- **Research:** Collaborated Research Oil Palm Expansion and Changing Multispecies Relations in East Kalimantan with Postgraduate Student of George Mason in Kutai Barat (2019)
- **Project:** Viu Short! Project with the theme of local myths that raise the content of cultural diversity, natural beauty, and uniqueness in Indonesia entitled “Meriam Etam” in Samarinda as Art Director (2019)
- **Project:** Appointed Community Service with International Relations and Technical Engineer in Bontang developed entrepreneurial science and technology for the community through e-commerce marketing strategies and industrial packaging design as an increase in profits for Bontang Mangrove syrup (2018)
- **Project:** Appointed Community Service with International Relations and Psychology Department at “Rumah Aman Samarinda” for children who was a victim of sexual violence and abandoned (2018)

ACHIEVEMENTS

- Runner Up Mahasiswa Berprestasi Universitas Muhammadiyah Kalimantan Timur (2020)
- Runner Up Indonesian Student Debate Competition UMKT (2020)
- Best Speaker Indonesian Student Debate Competition UMKT (2020)
- Best Paper Motion and Outstanding Delegate Diplomatic Course HI UMKT (2019)

Lampiran 2

LEMBAR PERNYATAAN LITERATURE REVIEW

Yang bertanda tangan dibawah ini:

Nama Lengkap : Andi Fitria Nuur Khasanah

NIM : 1811102434014

Program Studi : S1 Hubungan Internasional

Judul Penelitian : Analisis Pengaruh Modernisasi China Era Pemerintahan Xi Jinping Terhadap Kompleksitas Keamanan di Kawasan Asia Timur

Dengan ini peneliti menyatakan bahwa dalam laporan penelitian ini menggunakan *literature review* (kajian pustaka) dan tidak terdapat karya yang pernah diajukan untuk penelitian lain atau untuk memperoleh gelar kesarjanaaan pada perguruan tinggi lain, dan sepanjang pengetahuan peneliti juga tidak terdapat karya orang lain atau pendapat yang pernah ditulis atau diterbitkan oleh orang lain, kecuali yang secara tertulis diacu dalam naskah ini dan disebutkan dalam daftar pustaka.

Peneliti,



Andi Fitria Nuur Khasanah

East Asia's Security Architecture and the Role of the United States and Other External Actors—an Introduction

Howard Loewen and Stefan Fröhlich

While East Asia¹ gradually turns into the economically most important region worldwide, security risks seem to be increasing not diminishing. Besides traditional security issues, such as the Taiwan question, the strained relations between North and South Korea as well as North Korea's unpredictable external politics, maritime conflicts between China and some ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members in the South China Sea as much as between Japan and China about a group of islands in the East China Sea are also increasingly matters of concern. Moreover, facing a military rising and increasingly assertive China, not only traditional allies and strategic partners of the United States such as Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore but also new potential allies such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Myanmar are asking the US to play a larger role in the regional security architecture in East Asia (while Thailand, isolated by the West after the 2014 coup seems to be shifting toward China).

¹We conceive of East Asia as a subregion of Asia that comprises Northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea) and Southeast Asia (10 ASEAN member states and East Timor). The term Asia Pacific, which is also used by some authors in this special issue, encompasses East Asia, South Asia and Oceania.

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1 Xi Jinping restores the ideological imperative so as to boost his own power

Willy Wo-lap Lam

Introduction: Xi's obsession with the *chuxin* and his Maoist restoration

It was the summer of 2019. State President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping was busy preparing for a military parade on October 1 to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Elaborate plans for marking the centenary of the establishment of the CCP in mid-2021 are already in the works. The Xi leadership wants to show off China's latest intercontinental missiles, stealth jetfighters, aircraft carriers and space exploration hardware. Yet in the realm of thought and ideology, the 66-year-old Fifth-Generation 'prince-ling' has been doubling down on the imperative of the *chuxin*, or fulfilling the party's 'original aspirations'.¹

The top-priority ideological edict for 2019 was: 'Don't forget your *chuxin* [original aspirations] and firmly remember your mission.' This call to arms was prominently featured during President Xi's inspection trip to Inner Mongolia in mid-July. *Chuxin*, one of Xi's most used slogans, is a reference to the original goals of the CCP: they include serving the people, realising socialism with Chinese characteristics, boosting the power and efficacy of the party and consolidating the authority of the *zhongyang* or central party leadership. As Xi stated during his trip, 'We must firmly bear in mind our *chuxin* and mission and implement a developmental platform of putting the people as the core [of party work].' While the paramount leader waxed eloquent on 'new developmental concepts', he mainly dwelled on 'the job of stabilizing growth, pushing forward restructuring [of the economy], buttressing the standard of living and preventing risks'. The CCP Chief noted that the country's 70 years of achievement had 'fully proven that we are right in going down the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics'. He also noted that the

CCP has won the embrace and support of the people because our party has from beginning to end firmly guarded the *chuxin* and mission of seeking happiness for the Chinese people and aiming at the great renaissance of the Chinese nation.

Introduction

Xi Jinping, the ‘Peking Order’ and China’s post-COVID-19 political trajectory: a primer

Jagannath P. Panda and Arthur S. Ding

The National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is the real ‘political heart’ of China’s statehood through which the party sets the direction of China’s rise (中国崛起) both domestically and internationally. Therefore, there is certainly a clear correlation between domestic developments in China and its external behaviour. And the 19th CPC National Congress was no different in that regard. However, if every Congress in the Chinese political chronicle has been ‘special’ in offering something new to the country’s political trajectory, then the 19th National Congress held on October 18–24, 2017, was one of the most special events in post-Mao China.

The 19th National Congress was ‘special’ for several reasons: *first*, it marked the formal endorsement of Xi Jinping’s second term as the General Secretary of the CPC until 2022. Soon after, in March 2018, the National People’s Congress removed the two-term limit on the presidency too, effectively allowing Xi to remain in power for life.¹ Xi’s second term seems to resemble that of Chairman Mao’s tenure, rather than Deng Xiaoping’s reform era.² Deng, who along with his colleagues suffered serious political persecution by Mao during the Cultural Revolution period, attributed the ills of such a disaster to the concentration of power in a single leadership. For this reason, under Deng’s rule, the party chairman post was removed and, instead, that of the General Secretary was adopted. In addition, the rule of ‘collective leadership and division of labor’ (集体领导分工负责) in the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), CPC’s highest organ, was enacted.³ Under this rule, the General Secretary is only the first-among-equals within the PBSC.⁴ Further, state agencies were granted some room under the principle of separation of function between the party and the state (党政分工).

Nevertheless, Xi has completely upended the reform process that had started in the 1980s. He has taken all key levels of power, including political, economic and diplomatic/national security, in his own hands, while the other six PBSC members have become his subordinates; amended China’s constitution and eliminated the presidential term limit; and encouraged his own personality cult.⁵ He has almost abolished the separation of function between the party and the state. Further, he has placed priority on State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), while private enterprises, which have made

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China's Military Modernization in Space and Cyber and the Implications for the U.S.–Japan Alliance

Yuka Koshino

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

July/August 2021

The Taiwan Temptation

Why Beijing Might Resort to Force

By Oriana Skylar Mastro

For more than 70 years, China and Taiwan have avoided coming to blows. The two entities have been separated since 1949, when the Chinese Civil War, which had begun in 1927, ended with the Communists' victory and the Nationalists' retreat to Taiwan. Ever since, the strait separating Taiwan from mainland China—81 miles wide at its narrowest—has been the site of habitual crises and everlasting tensions, but never outright war. For the past decade and a half, cross-strait relations have been relatively stable. In the hopes of persuading the Taiwanese people of the benefits to be gained through a long-overdue unification, China largely pursued its long-standing policy of “peaceful reunification,” enhancing its economic, cultural, and social ties with the island.

To help the people of Taiwan see the light, Beijing sought to isolate Taipei internationally, offering economic inducements to the island's allies if they agreed to abandon Taipei for Beijing. It also used its growing economic leverage to weaken Taipei's position in international organizations and to ensure that countries, corporations, universities, and individuals—everyone, everywhere, really—adhered to its understanding of the “one China” policy. As sharp as these tactics were, they stopped well short of military action. And although Chinese officials always maintained that they had a right to use force, that option seemed off the table.

In recent months, however, there have been disturbing signals that Beijing is reconsidering its peaceful approach and contemplating armed unification. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made clear his ambition to resolve the Taiwan issue, grown markedly more aggressive on issues of sovereignty, and ordered the Chinese military to increase its activity near the island. He has also fanned the flames of Chinese nationalism and allowed discussion of a forceful takeover of Taiwan to creep into the mainstream of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The palpable shift in Beijing's thinking has been made possible by a decades-long military modernization effort, accelerated by Xi, aimed at allowing China to force Taiwan back into the fold. Chinese forces plan to prevail even if the United States, which has armed Taiwan but left open the question of whether it would defend it against an attack, intervenes militarily. Whereas Chinese leaders used to view a military campaign to take the island as a fantasy, now they consider it a real possibility.

U.S. policymakers may hope that Beijing will balk at the potential costs of such aggression, but there are many reasons to think it might not. Support for armed unification among the Chinese public and the military establishment is growing. Concern for international norms is subsiding. Many in Beijing also doubt that the United States has the military power to stop China from taking Taiwan—or the international clout to rally an effective coalition against China in the wake of Donald Trump's presidency. Although a Chinese invasion of Taiwan may not be imminent, for the first time in three decades, it is time to take seriously the possibility that China could soon use force to end its almost century-long civil war.

“NO OPTION IS EXCLUDED”



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*Active Denial: Redesigning Japan's
Response to China's Military Challenge*

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NO. 313

XI JINPING AND PLA TRANSFORMATION THROUGH REFORMS

YOU JI

**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
SINGAPORE**

21 MAY 2018

Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China

A Report to Congress

**Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000**

Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, as amended, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report "in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People's Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future."

9 China's foreign policy under Xi – reappraisal of China's partnership diplomacy

Meng-Chuh Liu, Po-Kuah Wu and Chia-Hsuan Wu

Introduction

A state's strategic interactions with the other actors, either cooperative or conflictive, have been substantially studied in the field of international relations. The recent scholarly work has been focusing on strategic partnerships between countries,¹ as the so-called 'partnership' is regarded as an important mechanism of cooperation in the polycentric world. Moreover, across the world, a government in the framing of its foreign policy may devise a number of 'special relationships' with other countries and even with multilateral organisations. Strategic partnerships have gradually covered the areas of foreign affairs, security issues and international challenges, such as climate change and global economic governance. In essence, the basic elements of strategic (comprehensive) partnerships between powers are governed by shared interests in global and regional issues as well as by common and diversified approaches.² Therefore, a strategic partnership policy may reflect a broader shift in their diplomacy paradigms.

In a similar vein, the notion of 'partnership' has become the critical element of Chinese diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. The Chinese first performed its 'partnership' diplomacy with its non-alliance principle. Then, China's strategic partnerships gradually serve as a comprehensive diplomatic framework for governing a wide range of policy areas. Furthermore, a strategic partnership regime has been used to some extent to harmonise as well as regulate China's relations with other international actors.³ In other words, China regards international society as an open process of complex and dynamic networks. It believes that rules, regimes and institutions may not only be set to govern or restrain the behaviour of individual actors in international society, but also to harmonise relations among these members. Therefore, China's international partnerships not only reflect a set of its own norms and values but also reveal its changing roles in international society.

Building strategic partnerships with other countries have been one of the notable dimensions of Chinese diplomacy. Yet, China's diplomatic partnerships remain largely unexplored in academic literature and policy debates.

11 China–Southeast Asia relations in the era of Xi Jinping

Ian Storey

Introduction

Since his accession to the apex of China's political system – first as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, and then as president and chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2013 – Xi Jinping has become the country's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. He has discarded the post-Mao notion of collective leadership, launched a wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign (removing many of his political rivals in the process) and abolished presidential term limits, effectively making himself leader for life. Domestically, Xi has cracked down on civil society, dramatically tightened censorship, pursued repressive policies in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang and fostered a cult of personality. Under Xi, the military's budget has maintained steady growth, the armed forces have been reformed and restructured, new offensive capabilities have been acquired, and defence diplomacy activities have been stepped-up around the globe. In the conduct of Chinese foreign policy, Xi has discarded former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's maxim that the People's Republic of China (PRC) should 'hide its capabilities and bide its time' and pursued a more nationalist, proactive and self-confident role on the world stage particularly vis-à-vis the United States. Xi's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a trillion-dollar global infrastructure project involving the construction of railways, ports, highways, pipelines and airports designed to deepen and enlarge China's connectivity with countries in the rest of Asia, Europe and Africa, has spotlighted the great power ambitions of the PRC.

In the relatively short time that Xi has been in power, his economic, defence and foreign policies have exerted an enormous impact on the countries of Southeast Asia, such that Sino–Southeast Asia relations are qualitatively different than they were prior to 2012 – in scope, intensity and tenor. However, it would be an exaggeration to state that Xi has had a *transformative* impact on China–Southeast Asian relations, for two reasons.

First, since the end of the Cold War, China's trade with (and more recently investment in) the region has been growing apace, its political relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been

LEMBAR KONSULTASI

DIISI OLEH PEMBIMBING I

**Daftar Kegiatan Pembimbingan Skripsi
Program Studi Hubungan Internasional FEBP – UMKT**

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Judul Penelitian : Analisis Pengaruh Modernisasi Militer
 China Era Pemerintahan Xi Jinping
 terhadap Kompleksitas Keamanan di Asia
 Timur
Pembimbing Pertama : Khoirul Amin, S.IP., M.A

No	Kegiatan	Paraf
1	Pembahasan Topik Penelitian, identifikasi variabel analisis dan perumusan judul topik penelitian (20-01-2022)	
2	Identifikasi research gap dan rujukan literature review (31-01-2022)	
3	Penyusunan latar belakang penelitian, landasan teori dan konsep dan metodologi penelitian (03-02-2022)	
4	Review struktur BAB I dan peninjauan ulang fokus telaah analisis (15-02-2022)	
5	Review telaah analisis, operasionalisasi teori, research gap dalam lit. review, indentination, catatan kaki dan etika penulisan (01-03-2022)	
6	Review telaah analisis, operasionalisasi teori, research gap dalam lit. review (24-02-2022)	
7	Review telaah analisis, operasionalisasi teori, research gap dalam lit. review, indentination, catatan kaki dan etika penulisan (05-03-2022)	
8	Hasil Penelitian, saran implementasi teori dan catatan untuk bab selanjutnya (06-04-2022)	
9	Arahan hasil penelitian, review per-BAB, checking penulisan (09-05-2022)	
10	Review BAB IV dan BAB V dan hasil keseluruhan dari penelitian skripsi (24-06-2022)	

Skripsi 2 : ANALISIS PENGARUH
MODERNISASI MILITER CHINA
ERA PEMERINTAHAN XI JINPING
TERHADAP KOMPLEKSITAS
KEAMANAN DI ASIA TIMUR

by Andi Fitria Nuur Khasanah

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Skripsi 2 : ANALISIS PENGARUH MODERNISASI MILITER CHINA ERA PEMERINTAHAN XI JINPING TERHADAP KOMPLEKSITAS KEAMANAN DI ASIA TIMUR

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