

# **LAMPIRAN**

## Lampiran 1 Biodata Peneliti



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
## LEMBAR PERNYATAAN LITERATUR REVIEW

Yang bertanda tangan dibawah ini:

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Judul Penelitian :Pengaruh Kebijakan Luar Negeri Asertif Xi Jinping Terhadap Stabilitas Hubungan China-Taiwan

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Peneliti,



Markysa Vebianova

## 13 Xi Jinping's PLA and China's regional security ambitions

*Mrittika Guha Sarkar*

### Introduction

Xi Jinping's refashioning of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and China's military diplomacy in recent years exemplifies his sincere and serious belief in the Mao Zedong dictum of 'Whoever has an army has power'.<sup>1</sup> Breaking up with Deng Xiaoping's 'hide and bide' policy, China has increasingly been viewing its military diplomacy as a vital tool for advancing its political goals and preserving its national security. At the same time, Xi has been reiterating Mao's perspective of China as the 'centre of gravity in Asia',<sup>2</sup> by introducing new ideas, institutions, reforms and initiatives in order to attain his national objectives of rejuvenation and the Chinese Dream.<sup>3</sup> The same is true for China's foreign policy strategy, which was echoed in the president's New Year's Eve speech in 2015 when Xi announced his vision for China as a 'moderately prosperous society'.<sup>4</sup> Subsequently, in 2016, Xi propounded the restructuring of the PLA; and in 2017, the National Congress of the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC), too, advanced the national military goals of achieving mechanisation by the year 2020, evolving into a modernised power by 2035 and becoming a 'world-class power' by 2050. The evolution of PLA seems to be an integral part of Xi's national efforts, while the reforms and restructuring have only accentuated the military's role under the current leadership.

Xi elucidated the military reform process, both structural and organisational, while addressing the 89th anniversary of the PLA on August 1, 2016. The restructuring condensed the earlier seven Military Area Commands (MACs) into five Theatre Commands, each of which remains strategically responsible for a specific set of regions: the Northern Theatre has been responsible for Northeast Asia; the Eastern Theatre focuses on Taiwan and the East China Sea (ECS); the Southern Theatre covers the South China Sea (SCS) and land borders with Southeast Asian states; the Western Theatre handles the land borders with India and Central Asian states; and the Central Theatre takes care of the defence of the capital, as well as provides support to other Theatre Commands if needed.<sup>5</sup> Further, these Theatre Commands act as joint headquarters for the army, navy

## An Imagined Brotherhood: The Rhetorical Framework and Prospects for China–Taiwan Relations

Christina Lai 

*Current China–Taiwan relations are marked by a worrisome dynamic, as there is no convergence of rhetoric between the two sides. How can China and Taiwan build healthy relations given they disagree on many essential issues? More importantly, in what ways could the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan come up with a new framework, despite its recent setback in Taiwan’s 2018 mid-term elections, to engage a rising China? There is an urgent need for a framework of interaction, especially as the DPP, the ruling party, emphasizes the centrality of Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic systems in contrast to an increasingly assertive China under Xi. Drawing on sources from China and Taiwan and current literature on international relations, this study lays out a roadmap that enables both sides to step back from rivalry and move toward mutual accommodation in Asia. This article sets forth a framework of brotherhood for China–Taiwan relations in which both sides maintain their political identities while preserving cultural affinity. It traces the development of official discourse between China and Taiwan, and provides a guideline for how to construct a rhetorical common ground: a family framework that can transform China–Taiwan relations into an imagined brotherhood. In turn, this article provides policy implications for the DPP, so it can proactively engage in political conversations with Beijing while maintaining space for rhetorical maneuvers.*

**Key words:** *China–Taiwan relations, United States, East Asian security, foreign policy, discourse analysis.*

### Introduction

On 2 January 2019, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen delivered an official statement in response to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s policy toward the

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All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*

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**OSW REPORT**

WARSAW  
APRIL 2020

# **THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS STATE**

XI JINPING'S CONSERVATIVE TURN

Michał Bogusz, Jakub Jakóbowski



# Kajian Historis atas Kompleksitas Isu Taiwan dalam Hubungan China dan Amerika Serikat

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## ABSTRAK

Artikel ini merupakan analisis deskriptif terhadap sejarah hubungan China dan Amerika Serikat di Selat Taiwan. Kedua negara itu memandang isu Taiwan dalam perspektif berbeda. Secara historis, China menganggap Taiwan sebagai bagian integral dari wilayahnya. Namun, disintegrasi yang sempat dialami Taiwan membuat sebagian rakyat Taiwan tidak merasa sebagai bagian dari China. Situasi itu dimanfaatkan oleh AS yang mulai melancarkan intervensi sejak 1950-an. Akibatnya, wilayah Taiwan menjadi arena pertarungan China dan AS yang saling berebut pengaruh regional. Berdasarkan Taiwan Relations Act (1979), AS terus menjual senjata ke Taiwan selama tiga dekade. Sesuai dengan Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (2013), China berinisiatif membuka pasar bebas dengan Taiwan. Tak pelak, ketegangan di antara kedua negara kerap terjadi. Tetapi, demi menjaga stabilitas kawasan, China dan AS menahan diri agar tidak meningkatkan eskalasi menjadi konflik terbuka yang berujung perang. Karena itu, dapat dikatakan bahwa relasi kedua kekuatan global tersebut disharmonis dalam keharmonisan.

**Kata-Kata Kunci:** Taiwan, China, Amerika Serikat, hubungan, Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA).

*This paper is descriptive analysis on the historical relations of China and the United States in Taiwan Strait. Both states view Taiwan issue in different perspective. Historically, China views Taiwan as its territorial part. However, disintegration in the past has caused Taiwanese have no feeling as the part of China. This has triggered the US to intervene since 1950s. Consequently, Taiwan area has become stage of competition between China and the US which contest on regional influence. Based on Taiwan Relations Act (1979), the US continues to sell arms to Taiwan for three decades. Based on Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), China initiates to open liberal market with Taiwan. Inevitably, tension between two states sometimes happens. However, in order to maintain regional stability, China and the US don't increase it to the actual conflict so that their relations is disharmony in harmony.*

**Key Words:** Taiwan, China, United States, relations, Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA).

# **Why Taiwan?**

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GEOSTRATEGIC RATIONALES FOR  
CHINA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Alan M. Wachman

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*Stanford University Press • Stanford, California 2007*



## Xi Jinping in Command: Solving the Principal–Agent Problem in CCP–PLA Relations?

Chien-wen Kou\*

### Abstract

The PLA has been a key player in Chinese elite politics since 1949. However, a series of developments over the last four years has prompted China watchers to re-evaluate Party–military relations. This paper argues that CCP–PLA relations in the Xi Jinping era are characterized by the centralization of power in a single civilian individual. This centralization is reflected by events such as a new emphasis on the CMC chairman responsibility system, the establishment of new coordination bodies under the top leader, radical reforms to the military command structure, the promotion of Xi’s public image as the top leader, and large-scale personnel reshuffles during which Xi’s trustees have gradually come to occupy key military posts while his rivals have been removed. For Xi, these measures are an antidote to the principal–agent problem in CCP–PLA relations caused by both information asymmetry and the discrepant interests of civilian leaders and the top brass of the PLA.

**Keywords:** People’s Liberation Army (PLA); Xi Jinping; Chinese civil–military relations; Chinese domestic politics

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a key player in Chinese elite politics since 1949. Its relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has evolved from “dual-role elites” to “professional soldiers under the command of the CCP.”<sup>1</sup> However, a series of recent events has encouraged China watchers to re-evaluate relations between the Party and the military in the Xi Jinping 习近平 era.

This paper argues that the centralization of power in a single civilian individual has set the basic tone of CCP–PLA relations under Xi’s administration, although the principle that the Party commands the gun remains unchanged. Several phenomena are indicative of this trend: the new emphasis on the Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman responsibility system (*junwei zhuxi fuzezhi* 军委主席负责制), the establishment of new coordination bodies under

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1 Kou 2011, 1–10.

# Xi Jinping and the National Security Commission: policy coordination and political power

DAVID M. LAMPTON\*

*This article discusses the rationale for, and progress to date of, creating a National Security Commission in China, a move first announced in late 2013. Central impulses for the Commission's establishment are to help better coordinate a very fragmented bureaucracy and to advance Xi Jinping's drive to consolidate his personal power over the internal and external coercive and diplomatic arms of the governing structure. The Commission is a work in progress and its full institutional maturation will take a protracted period. In the midst of the Commission's construction, there is considerable confusion among subordinates in the foreign policy and security areas about lines of authority and ultimate objectives. Beyond Xi Jinping, it is difficult to discern an authoritative voice. It is an open question as to whether this institutional attempt to achieve coordination will improve, or further complicate, China's long-standing coordination problem, some recent foreign policy achievements notwithstanding. The Commission's focus is heavily weighted toward internal and periphery security, but it also is an institution-building response to new global and transnational issues. It is not self-evident that Xi, or any single individual, can effectively manage the span of control he is constructing.*

## Introduction

A simple question initially motivated the research reported here: what is China's National Security Commission (*Zhongyang guojia anquan weiyuanhui*), established

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\* David M. Lampton is Hyman Professor and Director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins—SAIS. Chairman of the Asia Foundation and former president of the National Committee on US–China Relations, his most recent book is *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping* (University of California Press, 2014). The author wishes to thank SAIS student Yingdi Lei for his research assistance, as well as SAIS Ph.D. students Yali Chen and Amanda Kerrigan for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this work. Ms. Zhaojin Ji deserves thanks for her work on Chinese language materials and the author also expresses his appreciation to Chinese officials, scholars, military personnel and foreign diplomats who shared their knowledge and analysis of the Commission with the author in October, November and December 2014, during two separate research trips to China, in conversations outside of China and in third countries. This article has also benefitted from the comments of Professor Suisheng (Sam) Zhao at the University of Denver and Professor Bo Kong at the University of Oklahoma. Finally, the author expresses appreciation to the two anonymous referees who offered very helpful guidance. An early version of this research was prepared for presentation to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in Ottawa, Canada, in November 2014. The author can be reached by email at [dmlampton@jhu.edu](mailto:dmlampton@jhu.edu)

## Diplomatic Control, Foreign Policy, and Change under Xi Jinping: A Field-Theoretic Account

Dylan M. H. LOH

**Abstract:** This article outlines how Xi Jinping has exercised control over diplomatic actors, particularly China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and draws out the effects of this control for the ministry and for Chinese foreign policy. Leveraging Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of “field,” I demonstrate how Xi has – through processes of socialisation, restriction, and displays of fealty – bred local diplomatic field incentives in which actors exhibit more loyal, assertive, and disciplined behaviour. Next, I introduce the idea of “transversal disruption” – the potential of local fields to disrupt and introduce change on and in overlapping fields, and vice versa. Practice theorists have relatively little to say about inter-field effects, and this article seeks to fill this gap by showing how field rules in the transnational diplomatic space can change when fields meet. I illustrate the above through three cases of field encounters: the multilateral Track II diplomacy field; the transnational fields of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and, the China–Malaysia bilateral diplomatic field.

■ Manuscript received 15 August 2018; accepted 2 April 2019

**Keywords:** China, Xi Jinping, fields, practice theory, diplomacy

**Dylan M. H. Loh** is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Studies, Cambridge University, and a faculty member of the Public Policy and Global Affairs Division, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include Chinese politics, international diplomacy, ASEAN, and practice theory. His articles have appeared in journals such as *Pacific Review* and *Journal of Chinese Political Science*. Dylan’s most recent article – “The Disturbance and Endurance of Norms in ASEAN: Peaceful but Stressful” – was published in the *Australian Journal of International Affairs* in 2018.

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## **4 The difficulty of being Xi Jinping<sup>1</sup>**

*Avinash A. Godbole*

Since the 19th National Congress held in October 2017, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has been governed under what is now called the “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. The policy document that came out of it at the end is quite significant for many reasons. The new principal contradiction, as stated by Xi, essentially acknowledges that China today is in midst of one of the most significant transitions in its modern political history. One of the fundamental questions facing the party today has to do with how the party retains its central authority and status in the lives of people even as its role from day-to-day affairs continues to retreat rapidly. This chapter is an exercise to understand the details of this question and the party’s search for answers to these.

The reasons to study the party are crystal clear; CPC governs the largest population that any country and the second largest economy in the world and has under its wings the armed forces that have one of the top defence budgets. It is also one of the last five odd single party Communist regimes in the world. Keeping CPC company are the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Laos, Cuba and Vietnam. It is also the only single party regime in top ten of the world economies.<sup>2</sup> Its ability, or lack of it, to adapt to the forces of change is bound to have a substantial impact on the world, in both political and economic terms.

There are various ways to look at this idea: the origins, the strengths and weaknesses and the implications of what the Xi Jinping thought means, and that is something that this chapter aims to do. However, before that there are three significant questions that need answering in order to understand as to what makes Xi unique. First, what is the Xi Jinping thought exactly and how it differentiates itself from the ideas of his predecessors, if at all? Second, what are the sources of legitimacy of the CPC. This question would help understand what happens to the party’s relations with the people in the post-ideological era and how the changing contours of accountability and of rule according to law would affect the future course of promotions. The third, how is the idea of Chineseness being reinvented and how does it impact the Xi legacy for the party in the longer run.



## Beijing's Policy Toward Taiwan

Beijing's strategy toward Taiwan is informed by not only realism, but also neo-functionalism and constructivism. Neo-functionalism, based on the European experiences, assumes that economic integration will eventually lead to political accommodation and integration, to Beijing's delight. Constructivism, as a supplement to primordialist assumption that Taiwan is historically part of China, can conveniently be employed to reconstruct the Chinese national identity. Despite the Sunflower Movement and the KMT's failure in the 2014 and the 2016 elections, Beijing has continued to engage the KMT and actively promote integrated development (*ronghe fazhan*) of economies and societies between the two sides to reconstruct a common identity. The continuity of Beijing's asymmetric engagements with the two main parties on the island is contingent upon the evolution of party politics on the island. At any rate, Beijing has paid more attention to ordinary people's feelings about cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges and considered quality of Strait exchange more important than quantity of activities. In addition, theories and practice of promoting national unification have been gradually emphasized. This is suggested by Xi Jinping's remarks on several occasions and recent policy announcement and implementation in terms of integrated development.






## Lampiran 3 Lembar Konsultasi Bimbingan Skripsi






DIISI OLEH PEMBIMBING I

### DATAR KEGIATAN BIMBINGAN SKRIPSI

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NO	KEGIATAN	PARAF
1.	Pembahasan topik penelitian, identifikasi variabel analisis dan perumusan judul topik penelitian (20-01-2022)	
2.	Identifikasi research gap dan rujukan literature review (31-01-2022)	
3.	Penyusunan latar belakang penelitian, landasan teori dan konsep dan metodologi penelitian (03-02-2022)	
4.	Review struktur BAB I dan peninjauan ulang fokus telaah analisis (15-02-2022)	
5.	Review telaah analisis, operasionalisasi teori, research gap dalam lit. review, indentation, catatan kaki dan etika penulisan (01-03-2022)	

6.	Review telaah analisis, operasionalisasi teori, research gap dalam lit. review (24-02-2022)	
7.	Review telaah analisis, operasionalisasi teori, research gap dalam lit. review, indentination, catatan kaki dan etika penulisan (05-03-2022)	
8.	Persetujuan pengajuan BAB II	
9.	Persetujuan pengajuan BAB III	
10.	Persetujuan pengajuan BAB IV	

**Lampiran 4 Turnitin**

Skripsi 1 : PENGARUH  
KEBIJAKAN LUAR NEGERI  
ASERTIF XI JINPING TERHADAP  
STABILITAS HUBUNGAN CHINA-  
TAIWAN

*by* Markysa Vebianova

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# Skripsi 1 : PENGARUH KEBIJAKAN LUAR NEGERI ASERTIF XI JINPING TERHADAP STABILITAS HUBUNGAN CHINA-TAIWAN

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